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Abstract 
On 22 January 2015, the ECB finally announced its expanded asset repurchase programme, 
better known as quantitative easing (ECB, 2015c). In this thesis, we are examining the effect of 
this announcement on sovereign bond yields in the Eurozone using the event study 
methodology and by time series forecasting (ARMA). We are particularly interested to see if 
there have been some abnormal variations (i.e. changes) in yields following the above-
mentioned announcement. Furthermore, we also examine the announcement on 4 September 
2014, during which the precursor programmes to QE were announced. 
We found statistically and economically significant abnormal variations in yields for our event 
study across all investment grade euro area government bonds, i.e. yields have generally 
dropped following the announcements. The graphs we obtained using ARMA forecasting help 
illustrate this. 
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1. Introduction 
1.1. Background 
“By adopting unconventional measures of monetary easing, central banks seek mainly to 
stimulate growth, bring down joblessness to reasonable levels and support their banking 
systems by pumping more money into the economy to boost spending” (Hausken & Ncube, 
2013). 
Since Europe has not fully recovered from the sovereign debt crisis, with sluggish economic 
growth figures and low inflation levels in the Eurozone, the ECB has decided to embark on 
unconventional monetary policies. As we shall discuss later in more detail, the conventional 
monetary tools of the ECB are the control over the key interest rates, at which they provide 
money for financial institutions in the Eurozone. However, now the ECB has chosen to start a 
QE programme, like we already have seen in Japan, the US and the UK. It is a controversial 
method that is relatively new and on which there has been conducted significantly less research 
than on other macroeconomic fields. 
Empirical research has shown that the Fed’s QE programme has been effective in lowering 
interest rates, particularly for medium and longer term debt securities. On average, a drop in 
the yield of 140 basis points for treasuries with maturities over 5 years has been observed and 
of 60 basis points for shorter maturities (Hausken & Ncube, 2013, p. 37). Thus, we expect to 
observe a similar phenomenon in the Eurozone. Furthermore, the portfolio rebalancing channel 
assumes that since QE lowers interest rates on government bonds, investors will lean more 
towards buying shares, which will offer superior returns, since they are riskier. Intuitively, this 
makes sense, since if risk-free assets generate virtually zero return; the only way to generate 
return for an investor is to hold risky assets. 
As one can see from Figure 1 below, equity indices from the euro area have increased 
dramatically following the ECB’s announcement of its big Public Sector Purchase Programme 
(PSPP) on 22 January 2015. When it comes to sovereign bond yields, those have been 
decreasing more or less steadily since the beginning of 2014 (and even before) as one can see 
from Figure 2 below.1 One contributing factor to this is the fact that safe bonds have had 
increased demand, which resulted in higher prices and thus lower yields (to maturity). 
                                                 
1 N.B.: We are talking about AAA-rated bonds here that are considered risk-free 
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Figure 1: Development of major European equity indices (base 100 at t0 = 2014-01-01) 
 
Source: Datastream 
Figure 2: Euro area AAA-rated government bond yields (t0 = 2014-01-02) 
 
Source: (ECB, 2015a) 
 
3 
1.2. Research aim and objectives 
The ECB QE programme is a relatively new phenomenon, and few, if any, studies have been 
published about it at the time writing. Thus, we have decided to empirically analyse the 
announcement of the programme, especially with regard to its effect on asset prices. Instead of 
investigating equity prices, we have decided to study the impact of the announcement on 
government bond yields. This is because the impact on sovereign bonds is a direct one, since 
they are being purchased directly by the ECB in secondary markets. For equities, the impact is 
only an indirect one, as those are not being purchased by the ECB and thus the impact arises 
from investors altering their portfolios following the QE announcement. 
Our aim is to show that there has been an immediate market reaction following the 
announcement(s) of the QE programme. This reaction should be illustrated by asset price 
changes. More specifically, and in accordance with QE theory that shall be discussed in chapter 
2, we are expecting bond yields to drop as a result of the announcement. This drop in yields 
will then be quantified with an event study that should return the negative change in yields. 
This phenomenon will also be illustrated with ARMA modelling (see chapter 4), where we 
expect to find that yields forecasted with the pre-event time series data will be above the actual 
yield observed following the announcement on 22 January 2015. 
 
1.3. Research limitations 
The only data we can use at this moment in time are bond yields. These are available in daily 
frequency and are thus suitable for an event study. Furthermore, to our knowledge, there do not 
exist any event studies yet on the announcement of the QE programme of the ECB. Thus, we 
cannot compare our results to those of other researchers. However, there are studies on the 
previous QE programmes of the Bank of Japan, the Fed in the US and the Bank of England. 
 
1.4. Outline of the thesis 
In the following, we shall give a short outline of the structure of this paper. The first part 
(chapter 2) describes the ECB’s conventional and unconventional monetary policies. Then, we 
will describe in more detail the technical aspects of the recently announced QE programme. To 
conclude chapter 2, we will outline a theoretical framework explaining the mechanisms through 
which QE works, and which effects we will be expecting as a result of our empirical analysis. 
4 
In the core part (chapters 3 and 4), we will present the empirical research methods that we are 
going to use. Chapter 3 is focused on the event study. First, we will illustrate the econometric 
techniques applied. Then, we will present and discuss the results obtained from this model. 
Chapter 4 will first cover theoretical aspects of univariate time series modelling and forecasting 
in section 4.1. Subsequently, we will present the methodology used to obtain our models in 
section 4.2. We will also present and discuss our results in said section. 
Finally, in chapter 5, we will draw a conclusion on this paper.  
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2.  Theoretical perspectives on monetary policy and QE 
2.1. ECB conventional monetary policy 
Before implementing our models, we shall briefly discuss what QE consists of, what its 
motivations are, how it is implemented and what its expected effects are. First, we should 
however discuss how monetary policy decisions in the Eurozone are made. Those decisions are 
made by the Eurosystem, which consists of the ECB and the 19 national central banks of this 
monetary zone. The role of the Eurosystem can be compared to the role of the Federal Reserve 
in the United States. Decisions are made by a vote of the ECB governing council, which consists 
of the ECB executive board that has six members, including the ECB president, currently Mario 
Draghi, and the heads of the national central bank in the Eurozone (Krugman, et al., 2015, pp. 
674-675). 
By the power of the treaty of Maastricht, the ECB has the mandate to pursue price stability. 
According to its own website, the ECB has the aim to keep inflation rates below, but close to 
2% over the medium term (ECB, 2015b). To assess inflation levels, it uses the Harmonised 
Index of Consumer Prices (HICP). Like any central bank, the ECB’s main policy tool is the 
adjustment of the key interest rates at which commercial banks can borrow or deposit money 
with the Eurosystem. They are decided upon when the governing council meets, which is twice 
a month. These key interest rates are (ECB, 2015b): 
 The interest rate on main refinancing operations (MROs): one-week liquidity-
providing operations (short term). MROs are conducted by weekly tenders (fixed or 
variable rate)2. 
 The rate of the deposit facility: the interest banks receive for overnight deposits. 
 The rate of the marginal lending facility: the interest banks have to pay for overnight 
credits. 
These three key interest rates influence the general level of interest rates in the Eurozone. 
During the recent financial and sovereign debt crises, we have seen these interest rates being 
lowered over and over, until they have reached zero or even slightly negative values. 
                                                 
2 Fixed rate tenders have the interest rates fixed by the ECB. Banks only communicate the amount of money 
needed. For a variable rate tender, the banks communicate both amounts needed and the interest they are willing 
to pay. Thus banks can influence the interest level for variable rate tenders. 
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This is illustrated in figure 3 below, which maps the ECB key interest rates from its origin in 
1999 until now.3 
Figure 3: ECB key interest rates from 1999-01 to 2014-09 
 
Source: (ECB, 2015d) 
 
As one can see from the figure above, key interest rates were relatively high during the first 
years of the ECB’s and the euro’s existence. They then lowered, but started to climb up again 
in the advent of the financial crisis of 2007-2009. As a response to the crisis, the ECB decided 
to cut interest rates to a historic low in 2009. They have then slightly increased again, but have 
been lowered further with the outbreak of the European sovereign debt crisis. Thus, since 2012, 
key interest rates have been steadily declining until reaching their lowest point on 10 September 
2014. At that point, the deposit facility had become negative, with -0.20%, meaning that 
financial institutions had to effectively pay the ECB for the privilege of parking their excess 
liquidity there. The other two key interest rates, the MRO and the marginal lending facility had 
reached the low of 0.05% and 0.30%, respectively. One must note that key interest rates have 
not changed since 10 September 2014. This change was announced on 4 September 2014, which 
as you will see coincides with our first announcement date for the ABSPP and the CBPP3. 
                                                 
3 N.B.: No key interest rate changes have been made after 2014-09-10 (effective date of last change). The 
announcement day for this change was on 2014-09-04 (the date of the ABSPP and CBPP3 announcement). 
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The graph illustrates that there was not much room left for the ECB to conduct conventional 
monetary policy, since the lower bound for key interest rates had been reached. However, it 
would have still been possible to further lower the key interest rates, meaning making 
increasingly negative the deposit facility and setting to zero both the MRO and the marginal 
lending facility.4 But this, as mentioned before, is not a lot of room to play with. With these 
conventional policies being exhausted, the ECB can result to unconventional methods, among 
which is QE. In the following section, we will outline some examples of ECB unconventional 
monetary policy, other than QE, to which we will come back later.  
 
2.2. ECB unconventional monetary policy 
Since the outbreak of the financial crisis in 2008, the ECB has not only responded by adjusting 
(downwards) key interest rates, as we have illustrated before. It has also embarked on 
unconventional (or non-standard) monetary policies, of which we will present a few in this 
chapter. The first example of those policies is Long Term Refinancing Operations (LTROs). 
LTROs can be split into two different subgroups (Fratzscher, et al., 2014): 
 Supplementary Long Term Refinancing Operations (SLTROs): maturities between 
six months to one year 
 “Very” Long Term Refinancing Operations (VLTROs): maturity of three years 
These are collateralized loans with longer maturities than the usual MROs. The ECB has 
conducted 20 SLTROs with six-month maturities between 2008 and 2011. The largest of those 
has been €50 billion. In May 2009, the ECB started the first 12-month SLTRO and subsequently 
conducted four of them until December 2011. The largest 12-month SLTRO auction has been 
as big as €442 billion. These SLTROs have increased the ECB balance sheet. It peaked at €160 
billion in March 2009 for the six-month operations and peaked at €660 billion in early 2010 for 
the 12-month operations. When the sovereign debt crisis intensified in late 2011, the ECB 
announced two VLTROs, both with three-year maturities. During both VLTROs, €1019 billion 
were allotted in total (Fratzscher, et al., 2014). 
Another example of a non-standard monetary policy is the Securities Markets Programme 
(SMP). It was announced on 10 May 2010 and consisted of direct purchases (in the secondary 
markets) of sovereign bonds of countries experiencing financial distress. Bonds were to be held 
                                                 
4 N.B.: The MRO and the marginal lending facility cannot become negative since this would mean the ECB would 
pay financial institutions for borrowing its money. 
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until maturity and purchases were initially limited to government bonds most affected by the 
crisis, i.e. Greek, Portuguese and Irish government bonds. The SMP was later extended to 
Italian and Spanish government bonds in a second round of purchases starting in August 2011. 
In early 2012, when market conditions improved, the ECB stopped purchases. By February 
2012, €220 billion of sovereign bonds were bought. During the SMP, purchases were made on 
a daily basis if deemed necessary by market conditions. No predetermined targets of prices or 
quantities existed. In fact, there were not many operational details available for the SMP 
(Fratzscher, et al., 2014). 
The SMP was officially deactivated when a new monetary instrument was introduced in 
September 2012, called Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT). This consisted of the 
possibility of unlimited purchases of government bonds with maturities of up to three years, i.e. 
with a focus on the short term. A further condition was that the debt had to be issued by 
countries that were under a macroeconomic adjustment programme of the European Stability 
Mechanism (ESM). The aim of the OMT was to “maintain an ‘appropriate monetary policy 
transmission and the singleness of the monetary policy’ by lowering bond yields and therefore 
decreasing borrowing costs” (Rivolta, 2014). Before the OMT was announced, Mario Draghi, 
the president of the ECB, made the important and famous declaration in late July 2012: “Within 
our mandate, the ECB is ready to do whatever it takes to preserve the euro. And believe me, it 
will be enough” (Mario Draghi, 2012 cited in Rivolta, 2014). This was indeed a very powerful 
statement and according to Fratzscher et al. (2014), the subsequent announcement of the OMT 
was sufficient to calm markets. However, by the time of writing their report, in November 2014, 
no purchases of government bonds had actually been made under the OMT programme 
(Fratzscher, et al., 2014). 
These unconventional monetary policies have given rise to many event studies over the past 
years that were assessing their impact on financial markets, i.e. asset prices and bond yields. 
An example is the event study of Rivolta (2014), who studied the impact of LTROs on sovereign 
bond yields. We will use parts of her event study methodology to study the impact of the QE 
announcement later in chapter 3. Since some of these unconventional monetary policy 
programmes involved the purchasing of government bonds in some form, they have somewhat 
paved the way to QE. 
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2.3. Details of the ECB QE programme 
Now, in the following, we shall describe in more detail the QE programme of the Eurosystem, 
officially baptised the Extended Asset Purchase Programme (EAPP). The EAPP consists in fact 
of three different programmes: the Asset Backed Securities Purchase Programme (ABSPP) and 
the 3rd Covered Bond Purchase Programme (CBPP3), which were both announced on 4 
September 2014 and the PSPP, announced on 22 January 2015. Together these amount to 60 
billion euros of monthly asset purchases. The lion’s share of this is the PSPP to which 50 billion 
euros are appointed. The remaining 10 billion euros are attributed to the ABSPP and the CBPP3. 
These programmes are running until at least September 2016, but are officially open-ended 
(Claeys, et al., 2015). 
The 50 billion euros of the PSPP are broken down the following way: 6 billion euros will go 
towards the purchase of the debt of supranational institutions located in the euro area. The 
remaining 44 billion euros will be used to purchase sovereign debt securities, i.e. government 
bonds. Of those, 4 billion will be held by the ECB and the remaining 40 billion by the national 
central banks (NCB). Each NCB can only purchase securities of its own government and the 
profits shall be attributed to its own national economy. The ECB has imposed some limits to 
the programme, so that it does not violate its prohibition of monetary financing. Claeys et al. 
(2015) estimate that this operation constrains the length and size of the programme. Even if the 
programme were to be renewed after September 2016, given that the limits will be strictly 
applied, only €799.7 billion of government bonds are expected to be purchased out of the 836 
billion currently planned (Claeys, et al., 2015). 
According to Claeys et al. (2015), the PSPP is already benefitting European public finances 
since yields have already significantly fallen since mid-2014 in anticipation of the programme. 
The exact impact however still remains to be seen, as purchases of the PSPP have just started 
on 9 March 2015.With falling yields, governments will be able to issue bonds with a lower 
coupon that is equal (or at least close to) the yield required by investors at the time of the 
auction. Consequently, governments will benefit from a cheaper cost of borrowing that should 
ease their public finances. 
Regarding the amount of outstanding sovereign debt securities, there was a total outstanding 
amount of €6.2 trillion at face value, estimated at €7.3 trillion market value. 80 percent of this 
debt comes from the four biggest European economies (France: €1.5 trillion, Italy: €1.4 trillion, 
Germany: €1.2 trillion and Spain: €0.8 trillion). For the PSPP, only securities with maturities 
between 2-30 years are eligible. Furthermore, bonds have to yield more than the deposit facility 
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rate. Hence, this excludes German government bonds with a yield below -0.2%. Thus the total 
eligible amount for the PSPP is about €4.3 trillion at face value and €5.3 trillion at market value 
(Claeys, et al., 2015). This eligibility will have an impact on the yield variation following the 
announcement, since short-term bonds with a maturity of less than two years will not be directly 
affected by the ECB purchases. 
For the ABSPP and the CBPP3, no minimum maturities or other eligibility criteria have been 
communicated on the press conference on 4 September 2014. Mario Draghi stated instead that 
“the detailed modalities of these programmes will be announced after the Governing Council 
meeting of 2 October 2014” (ECB, 2014). This, and the fact that Asset Backed Securities and 
Covered Bonds are derivatives that may have as the underlying asset public or private debt, 
means that we cannot be certain for our event study, that any abnormal variations in yields are 
due to the announcement of the ABSPP and CBPP3 programmes. Instead, abnormal variations 
might simply be due to the announcement of the lowering of the three key interest rates by 10 
basis points each. This, as explained before, has occurred on the same day. On the contrary, for 
the PSPP, the technical annex has been published the same day that the announcement was 
made. This, and the fact that key interest rates remained unchanged, means that for the 22 
January 2015 announcement, we expect any abnormal variations being due to the 
announcement only. 
In the following table, we will give a brief summary of the complete ECB QE programme, 
based on information from Claeys et al. (2015) and Goldman Sachs (2015). 
Table 1: Summary of ECB QE programme 
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According to Goldman Sachs (2015), “this scale of purchases could expand the ECB’s balance 
sheet from its current €2.2 trillion to more than €3 trillion in early 2016, and potentially beyond 
€3.5 trillion if the outlook for inflation doesn’t materially improve.” 
To conclude this section, the scope of the ECB QE programme might have come as a surprise 
for many investors. This is because its size of bond purchases is unprecedented for the 
Eurozone. However, because of previous bond purchase programmes such as the SMP or the 
OMT, it was certainly expected by markets that the ECB would at some point launch a QE 
programme. The announcement of the decoupling of the Swiss franc the week before (see 
results discussion in section 3.3.2.) has drawn special attention to the ECB Governing Council 
meeting on 22 January 2015. However, information of scope and technical details of said 
programme should not have been available to investors before the Governing Council’s press 
conference on 22 January 2015. Therefore, we can expect this announcement to result in 
significant abnormal drops in yields across eligible euro area bonds. This is because we expect 
investors rushing to buy those before the ECB does (starting on 9 March 2015), thus increasing 
their prices through increased demand, and thus lowering the yields. However, before 
embarking on our event study, we will outline the mechanisms through which QE works, based 
on articles written about previous QE programmes of other central banks. 
 
2.4. Theoretical frameworks for the effects of QE 
Generally speaking, QE increases the liquidity of private-sector balance sheets by the central 
bank injecting money into the economy in return for assets. The fact that assets are purchased 
with central bank money pushes asset prices up. This should then in return lower the cost of 
borrowing and thus encourage higher consumption and investment spending. Higher spending 
occurs also since asset holders’ wealth increases with higher asset prices. A more intuitive way 
of thinking about it is the central bank printing more money (Lu, 2013, p. 351). 
More precisely, QE works through the three following main channels (Hausken & Ncube, 2013, 
pp. 5-6): 
 Portfolio balance channel 
 Signalling channel (or macro/policy news channel) 
 Liquidity premia channel 
In the following, we will give a brief explanation as to how these channels work. Those are 
based on a journal article by Joyce et al. (2011) that was published by the Bank of England. 
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The first channel, which is the portfolio rebalance channel, reflects the direct impact on asset 
prices through the fact that investors will rebalance their portfolios as a response to the ECBs 
asset purchases. This relies on the assumption that if “assets are not perfect substitutes, then a 
change in the quantity of a specific asset will lead, ceteris paribus, to a change in its relative 
expected rate of return” (Joyce, et al., 2011, p. 117). The base money that the central bank issues 
and the assets purchased during QE are not perfect substitutes. As a consequence, investors 
seek to rebalance their portfolio by purchasing assets similar to the ones sold. This pushes the 
prices of these assets up further and thus reduces yields. The effect of this channel is most 
significant for assets similar to those purchased by the central bank (Hausken & Ncube, 2013). 
The signalling channel is also called the macro/policy news channel. It captures news about 
expected future policy rates. For example, a QE programme could signal lower policy rates in 
the short term, but it could also signal higher policy rates in the future. Thus, the effects on 
yields and prices could either be positive or negative. According to Hausken & Ncube (2013), 
purchasing a large quantity of long-term assets through a QE programme serves as a credible 
commitment of a central bank to keep interests low in the future. This is because if it would 
choose to raise interest rates later, it would incur big losses on the assets purchased. 
The liquidity premia channel works through reducing the premia for illiquidity and thus 
improving the market functioning. Since the central bank is purchasing assets in big quantities, 
selling the assets becomes less costly for investors. Especially during crises, there may be big 
illiquidity premia, since there are not enough buyers for all the investors wishing to sell their 
assets. However, this channel only works while the central bank is repurchasing assets 
(Hausken & Ncube, 2013). 
These three channels mean that we are expecting to see the following results as a consequence 
of the ECB QE programme: Asset prices in the euro area will generally go up. Government 
bond prices, given that they are eligible, will be directly affected by the ECB purchases. So we 
expect the price of those to rise, as well as the price of similar bonds, i.e. with similar credit 
ratings and maturities. Since bond prices will increase, the yields (to maturity) will lower.5 
Those bonds will then be trading at a premium, i.e. their yield will be lower than their coupon 
rate. 
Since sovereign bonds, especially if AAA-rated, are considered risk-free, the general risk-free 
rate for the Eurozone is expected to decrease. As a consequence of this, investors need to 
                                                 
5 See: bond pricing formulas in appendix A3. 
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increasingly turn towards risky assets to help them generate the returns needed. Thus, as a 
consequence, we expect equity prices to increase. 
In the next chapter, we will proceed to the empirical analysis, starting by presenting the 
econometric methodology used for the event study. 
 
3. Event study 
3.1. Econometric methodology 
In order to measure the effect on bond yields caused by the unconventional monetary policy 
announcement, we decided to implement the event study methodology. The original purpose of 
this method is to evaluate the effect of certain economic events on firm value (such as M&A 
activities, issuing of new debt or equity, or announcements of macroeconomic data) by looking 
at abnormal asset price changes. The general model relies on the measurement of normal and 
abnormal returns. The normal return, that we define as 𝐸[𝑅𝑖𝑡
∗ |Ω𝑖𝑡], is the return that we are 
expecting given that the event did not take place. 𝑅𝑖𝑡
∗  represents the return for firm 𝑖 at time 𝑡 
and Ω𝑖𝑡 is the conditioning information for the normal performance model. The abnormal 
return, that is the return of our interest, is defined by 𝜀𝑖𝑡
∗ =  𝑅𝑖𝑡
∗ − 𝐸[𝑅𝑖𝑡
∗ |Ω𝑖𝑡]. After obtaining 
the abnormal return, its statistical significance needs to be tested. If we get a significant 
abnormal return, we can assume that the event of our interest had a statistically significant effect 
on asset prices (Asgharian, 2014). 
In our case however, we are not directly studying changes in asset prices. Hence, using the word 
“return” and using 𝑅 in the formulas is not technically correct and might be misleading. What 
we are studying here, are changes (or variations) in yields. Thus we will later use the letter 𝑣 
(for variation) instead of R in our formulas. 
There are different methods for estimating the expected normal returns, since these cannot be 
observed. In the following, we will quickly show some of them for purely illustrative purposes, 
as described by Asgharian (2014). 
 Constant-mean return model: Used if the mean return of a given security is assumed 
to be constant over time. 
 Market model: Used when there is a stable relation between the market return and the 
security return. 
 Multifactor model: Used when other factors in addition to the market portfolio are 
being included. Examples for factors are industry indices or firm size based portfolios. 
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Our initial idea was to implement an event study methodology using a multifactor model for 
calculating normal variations. Our dependent variables would have been yields of different 
countries and the multi-factor regressors would have been different macroeconomic variables 
that are correlated with those bond yields. The problem of this method is that yields are 
calculated on a daily basis (or even with faster frequencies), while most macroeconomic 
variables are only available on a monthly or quarterly basis. Previous studies have shown that 
using low frequency data for an event study about changes in bond yields will lead to 
insignificant results. Such a study was conducted by Modigliani & Sutch (1966), who 
performed an event study of Operation Twist during the Kennedy administration using quarterly 
data, without finding any significant results. This means that for our study, we have to use high-
frequency data, i.e. daily yields. 
For our model we then decided to perform the method implemented originally by Swanson, et 
al. (2011). For this research, a high-frequency event study was implemented to find significant 
abnormal changes in yields around the announcement days of the Operation Twist. This 
research tried to find significant results where Modigliani & Sutch (1966) previously failed. 
The authors used 1- or 2- day changes in treasury yields, affirming that this difference should 
be sufficient for explaining the effects of a particular announcement on the yield curve. This 
method relies on the assumption of rational expectations in financial markets that states that 
current market expectations reflect the future state of the general economy. As a consequence, 
asset prices will already reflect all the relevant information included in every particular 
announcement shortly after it has been made. In accordance with Swanson’s (2011) research, 
we thus chose the one-day change (or variation) in yields for conducting our event study. 
We decided to consider as a null hypothesis that our bond yields do not change (abnormally) 
following the announcements. Our alternative hypothesis is that there is a significant change in 
bond yields. Let 𝑣0be the null of there being no variation in the bond yields. Since we will 
conduct a two-sided test, we have the following two hypotheses: 
𝐻0: 𝑣𝑜 = 0 (1) 
𝐻1: 𝑣0 ≠ 0 (2) 
Here we have a Student’s t distribution with T-1 degrees of freedom. For a sample size of 30 
days, this gives us 29 degrees of freedom. We can then look up the critical value at the 95% 
confidence level for a two-sided test in a probability table, which can be found in many 
statistical and econometric textbooks, e.g. Introductory Econometrics for Finance by Chris 
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Brooks (2008).6 We have chosen to compute it ourselves with the TINV function in Excel.7 
Both the Brooks table and our computation yielded the critical value of 2.0452. (N.B.: Brooks 
uses α = 0.025 for a two-sided test at the 95% confidence level). This means that we reject the 
null if our test statistic exceeds the critical values of the interval (−2,0452 ;  2,0452). If we 
reject the null, our results are statistically significant, and if we cannot reject it, they are 
statistically insignificant. 
As the next step, we had to calculate the t-statistic. For this, we used Rivolta’s (2014) formula 
expressed by the following equation: 
𝑡𝑐𝑖𝑗 =
𝑣𝑐𝑖𝑗,𝑡−𝑣0
𝑠𝑑𝑐𝑖𝑗,𝑡
 ~ 𝑇(𝑇 − 1) (3) 
𝑣𝑐𝑖𝑗,𝑡 is the one day variation in the yield for bond i (which represents the maturity), country c 
during the event of interest j at time t. The one-day calculation for the yield variation is the 
following: 
𝑣𝑐𝑖𝑗,𝑡 = 𝑦𝑐𝑖𝑗,𝑡 − 𝑦𝑐𝑖𝑗,𝑡−1 (4) 
According to the model presented by Swanson, et al. (2011), we can thus examine if 𝑣𝑐𝑖𝑗,𝑡 is 
statistically significant. If this is the case, 𝑣𝑐𝑖𝑗,𝑡 is our abnormal return during the announcement 
day. We calculated the standard deviation for the 30 days variation previous to the 
announcement day, so it cannot be influenced by the event itself. We were doubtful about the 
length of the window for the standard deviation, so we decided to use 30 days, since it is the 
same length that Rivolta (2014, p. 12) suggests. 
Thus, our standard deviation calculation is: 
𝑠𝑑𝑐𝑖𝑗,𝑡 = √
∑ (𝑣𝑐𝑖𝑗,𝑡−?̅?𝑐𝑖𝑗,𝑡)
2𝑛
𝑡=1
𝑇−1
 (5) 
Where the sample size T is 30 (days prior to the announcement, i.e. without the announcement 
itself). 
Thus, as mentioned before, if statistically significant, 𝑣𝑐𝑖𝑗,𝑡 is our abnormal return. Before 
asserting this, however, we have make two major assumptions according to Rivolta (personal 
communication, 3 April 2015): 
                                                 
6 Critical values can be found in Table A2.2, p.617 in Brooks (2008). 
7 This function returns the two tailed inverse of the Student’s t-distribution. (= the critical value). 
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 Variation around the dates of our interest is only due to the announcement of 
unconventional monetary policy measure (i.e. no key interest rates have been adjusted 
the same day. 
 Variations are following a random walk process 𝑦𝑡 = 𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝑒𝑡 since expected 
variation is equal to zero. The random walk needs to be without drift, otherwise this has 
to be accounted for in the model. 
Using Excel we then developed this model to get the first results of our research. We calculated 
the abnormal returns around our two announcements of interest (4 September 2014 and 22 
January 2015) for each country we had selected. In the following section 3.2, we will outline 
which countries we selected and for which reasons, as well as how we obtained our data. 
 
3.2. Motivation of input choices 
3.2.1. Country selection 
We decided to perform this event study analysis for euro area and non-euro area countries. For 
the euro area countries we have picked the biggest economies in terms of GDP. These are the 
following (in alphabetical order): Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, 
Italy, Netherlands, Portugal and Spain. Of these 11 countries, the four biggest economies 
(Germany, France, Italy and Spain) represent over 75% of the GDP of the whole euro area. A 
pie chart of these countries can be found in the appendix (figure 17 in A6). 
As non-euro area countries, we chose Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and the United 
Kingdom. We decided to choose non-euro area countries, even if we do not expect any 
significant results, since we suspect that their economies are not totally independent from the 
euro area countries, i.e. there might be some spill over effects. 
3.2.2. Data selection 
We retrieved our data from two different sources. First, in order to get the general euro area 
yield curve, we downloaded data from the ECB website where we have found daily yield values 
with maturities of 1Y, 5Y, 10Y, 20Y and 30Y. These yields represent AAA-rated Euro area 
central government bonds (ECB, 2015a). These yields are updated every trading day at noon 
(12.00 PM CET). 
To get yields for individual countries we used Datastream. Thomson Reuters calculates daily 
yields for every country across different maturities. For our model, we decided to pick the 
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following maturities (if available) for each country: 1M, 3M, 6M, 1Y, 3Y, 5Y, 10Y, 20Y and 
30Y. We chose these maturities since they reflect the short, medium and long-term perspectives. 
Datastream expresses each yield that has been used under the following name format: 
‘TR name of the country GVT ZERO maturity’ 
These yields are calculated by Thomson Reuters using the bootstrapping method, which is a 
way to calculate zero-coupon yield curves, in order to make all the government bonds 
comparable. Unfortunately, for some countries not all of these maturities were available, so we 
simply put an ‘x’ in our results tables where these values were not available. 
3.2.3. Event window 
For both the 4 September 2014 and the 22 January 2015 announcements, we chose a one-day 
event window. We assume that one day is sufficient to capture the direct market response to the 
announcement. This is because both programs were been announced at 14.30 CET (time of the 
press conferences) and looking at intraday prices using Thomson Reuters Eikon, we have seen 
an immediate market reaction in the minutes following the announcements on e.g. Italian 10y 
government bond prices and by consequence also yields (prices went up, thus yields went 
down). 
However, concerning the AAA-rated bond data from the ECB, these have been calculated at 
12.00 CET. This meant that we had to use a two-day variation from January 21 to January 23 
instead, in order to properly capture the effect of this announcement, which was made shortly 
after the yields had already been calculated. 
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3.3. Event study results 
3.3.1. Results for AAA-rated euro area yields 
In this section, we are going to present the results of our event study. Table 2 shows the variation 
and the t-test for the AAA euro area yields calculated by the ECB.8 Statistically significant 
returns are highlighted in green. They exceed the interval of the critical values of +/- 2.0452 
and thus the null is rejected. However, the ECB did not provide data for maturities shorter than 
1Y. 
Table 2: Event study results for AAA-rated euro area countries 
 
We can clearly see that the first announcement (ABSPP and CBPP3) is statistically significant 
only for the medium term maturity (5Y). Regarding the announcement of the PSPP, there are 
statistically significant results for all the 5Y and 10Y yields, with no significant results for the 
1Y and 20Y and 30Y yields. So, for the first announcement, there was only an abnormal 
variation in the 5Y yields of -0.06063. This means that the yield fell from 0.296054% to 
0.235421%. In relative percentage terms, this is a drop in the yield of -20.48%, which makes 
the result seem all the more economically significant. However, as we shall show later, these 
findings might be merely coincidental for the first announcement. This is because on that 
announcement day, we found more significant results in the short term than the long term across 
euro area countries. We believe the reason for this to be that the ECB lowered the key interest 
rates the same day, on 4 September 2014. Thus, for that day, another model that could isolate 
the effect of lowering the key interest rates might have been more appropriate here. 
  
                                                 
8 According to the S&P Sovereigns Rating List (2015), the AAA-rated central government bonds are Germany, 
Finland and Luxembourg 
Date 1Y 5Y 10Y 20Y 30Y
2014-09-04 2-day variation -0,0024 -0,0606 -0,0352 0,0369 0,0689
ABSPP and CBPP3 announcement t-statistic -0,1941 -2,8880 -0,8745 0,6865 1,3453
2015-01-22 2-day variation 0,0030 -0,0810 -0,1240 -0,1137 -0,1004
PSPP announcement (QE) t-statistic 0,2240 -3,4654 -2,6557 -1,7043 -1,2487
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3.3.2. Results for selected euro area countries 
The following table shows all the results we obtained through our event study for our selected 
euro area countries. 
Table 3: Event study results for the 11 biggest euro area countries (in alphabetical order) 
  
Our results confirm our expectations: there is clearly evidence of statistical significant drops in 
yields across all the euro area countries (except for Greece). Almost all countries have 
significant abnormal variations on the two announcement days. It is also noticeable that the 
variations have been the highest for Italy, Portugal and Spain. However, one must bear in mind 
that these countries had experienced much higher yields prior to the announcement dates. Thus 
it makes more sense to compare abnormal variations in relative percentage terms. When it 
comes to Greece, we believe that the effect of the announcement is mostly not significant, since 
Country Date 1m 3m 6m 1y 3y 5y 10y 20y 30y
Austria 2014-09-04 1 day variation x x -0,0334 -0,0401 -0,0538 -0,0511 0,0018 0,0712 0,0728
ABSPP and CBPP3 announcement t-statistic x x -3,0629 -4,5231 -4,4922 -2,7050 0,0566 2,0966 2,1752
2015-01-22 1-day variation x x -0,0502 -0,0395 -0,0271 -0,0385 -0,0610 -0,0673 -0,0759
PSPP announcement (QE) t-statistic x x -2,7902 -3,2890 -2,7031 -2,3016 -1,9629 -1,5693 -1,7393
Belgium 2014-09-04 1-day variation -0,0592 -0,0527 -0,0541 -0,0645 -0,0702 -0,0657 -0,0244 0,0093 0,0136
ABSPP and CBPP3 announcement t-statistic -5,2190 -8,5326 -12,7093 -12,9063 -5,2159 -3,0921 -0,7342 0,2476 0,3404
2015-01-22 1-day variation -0,0189 -0,0195 -0,0216 -0,0257 -0,0299 -0,0417 -0,0819 -0,0877 -0,0795
PSPP announcement (QE) t-statistic -0,9399 -2,0078 -2,8916 -3,3239 -3,0976 -2,2770 -2,7300 -2,3872 -1,9062
Finland 2014-09-04 1-day variation x x -0,0424 -0,0547 -0,0677 -0,0610 -0,0041 0,0789 0,0751
ABSPP and CBPP3 announcement t-statistic x x -0,7700 -3,3858 -4,8469 -2,8731 -0,1282 2,2279 1,7646
2015-01-22 1-day variation x x -0,0069 -0,0161 -0,0276 -0,0392 -0,0720 -0,0530 -0,0677
PSPP announcement (QE) t-statistic x x -0,4275 -1,8361 -2,5535 -2,2084 -2,3262 -1,1769 -1,7996
France 2014-09-04 1-day variation -0,0329 -0,0586 -0,0747 -0,0721 -0,0721 -0,0715 -0,0203 0,0206 0,0243
ABSPP and CBPP3 announcement t-statistic -2,2823 -7,9399 -16,0902 -15,5919 -5,6932 -3,4357 -0,6275 0,5599 0,6250
2015-01-22 1-day variation 0,0014 -0,0015 -0,0041 -0,0068 -0,0190 -0,0379 -0,0810 -0,0803 -0,0809
PSPP announcement (QE) t-statistic 0,0694 -0,1048 -0,3588 -0,8187 -1,8923 -2,0450 -2,6728 -1,9683 -1,9438
Germany 2014-09-04 1-day variation -0,0230 -0,0346 -0,0473 -0,0589 -0,0515 -0,0428 0,0246 0,0769 0,0833
ABSPP and CBPP3 announcement t-statistic -1,1219 -3,1661 -7,1036 -6,7257 -3,5557 -2,0258 0,7610 1,9801 2,1100
2015-01-22 1-day variation 0,0297 0,0193 0,0072 -0,0065 -0,0182 -0,0323 -0,0673 -0,0537 -0,0524
PSPP announcement (QE) t-statistic 1,6705 2,0557 0,9858 -0,9224 -2,2403 -2,4131 -2,1999 -1,2126 -1,2263
Greece 2014-09-04 1-day variation 0,0184 0,0028 -0,0200 -0,0509 -0,1344 -0,1766 -0,1988 -0,1251 0,0832
ABSPP and CBPP3 announcement t-statistic 0,1613 0,0419 -0,4294 -0,8916 -1,1872 -1,3961 -1,7588 -1,5784 1,3048
2015-01-22 1-day variation -0,2962 -0,2178 -0,1728 -0,2630 -0,4472 -0,4233 -0,1841 -0,1046 -0,4731
PSPP announcement (QE) t-statistic -0,4997 -1,0290 -0,5113 -0,4097 -0,6199 -0,6786 -0,5253 -0,6580 -3,3434
Ireland 2014-09-04 1-day variation x x -0,0157 -0,0100 -0,0592 -0,0845 -0,0504 x x
ABSPP and CBPP3 announcement t-statistic x x -0,6480 -0,7241 -3,2656 -2,6326 -1,3223 x x
2015-01-22 1-day variation x x -0,0289 -0,0247 -0,0355 -0,0579 -0,0938 x x
PSPP announcement (QE) t-statistic x x -1,4138 -1,6670 -2,1007 -2,2061 -3,2144 x x
Italy 2014-09-04 1-day variation -0,0612 -0,0779 -0,0891 -0,1040 -0,1210 -0,1330 -0,1212 -0,0704 -0,0398
ABSPP and CBPP3 announcement t-statistic -2,9321 -4,6564 -5,0601 -5,1816 -3,3990 -3,1797 -2,6317 -2,2507 -0,9103
2015-01-22 1-day variation -0,0530 -0,0569 -0,0590 -0,0613 -0,0831 -0,1038 -0,1457 -0,2432 -0,2918
PSPP announcement (QE) t-statistic -0,6915 -1,5100 -2,7913 -2,7279 -2,1358 -2,2593 -3,1276 -5,6024 -5,8727
Netherlands 2014-09-04 1-day variation -0,0350 -0,0421 -0,0477 -0,0523 -0,0641 -0,0577 -0,0076 0,0663 0,0822
ABSPP and CBPP3 announcement t-statistic -2,9916 -6,9198 -9,2511 -8,7446 -4,8890 -2,6169 -0,2250 1,7860 2,2251
2015-01-22 1-day variation 0,0019 -0,0113 -0,0192 -0,0217 -0,0242 -0,0371 -0,0731 -0,0580 -0,0458
PSPP announcement (QE) t-statistic 0,0883 -0,8960 -2,0466 -2,6232 -1,9858 -1,4887 -2,3669 -1,3823 -1,0408
Portugal 2014-09-04 1-day variation 0,0304 0,0031 -0,0293 -0,0807 -0,1211 -0,0769 -0,0753 -0,0518 0,0764
ABSPP and CBPP3 announcement t-statistic 1,7859 0,3143 -2,5290 -4,8824 -1,8800 -0,9331 -1,0756 -1,1015 0,8288
2015-01-22 1-day variation 0,0085 0,0036 -0,0092 -0,0481 -0,1276 -0,1397 -0,1960 -0,2301 -0,1755
PSPP announcement (QE) t-statistic 0,2155 0,1463 -0,7042 -2,5379 -2,3482 -2,1317 -2,8864 -4,3822 -3,0236
Spain 2014-09-04 1-day variation -0,0708 -0,0709 -0,0703 -0,0744 -0,1010 -0,1226 -0,1365 -0,0872 -0,0860
ABSPP and CBPP3 announcement t-statistic -2,3224 -2,8560 -2,9703 -2,9172 -2,7187 -2,6776 -2,7272 -1,9608 -1,8442
2015-01-22 1-day variation -0,0347 -0,0483 -0,0601 -0,0711 -0,0819 -0,0879 -0,1560 -0,2691 -0,2895
PSPP announcement (QE) t-statistic -0,3528 -0,7631 -1,8110 -4,0243 -2,3549 -1,9931 -3,2651 -5,7345 -6,3058
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they do not meet the credit quality criteria of guideline ECB/2011/14 (ECB, 2011), i.e. their 
credit rating was lower than the minimum BBB- required to be eligible for the QE programme. 
But looking more deeply into figure 4, we can see from the distribution of these results, that the 
significant results are most present in the medium-term (3Y). This figure shows the percentage 
of significant results for each maturity tested. 
Figure 4: Distribution of significant results for the euro area 
 
One can see that the histogram of significant results seems to follow a bell-shaped normal 
distribution for the three programmes combined. However, they are slightly skewed towards 
the left (short term) for the ABSPP and the CBPP3 announcement and skewed to the right (long 
term) for the PSPP announcement. A possible explanation for this is that, as mentioned before, 
the PSPP excludes assets with maturities shorter than two years. This means that bonds with 
longer maturities are more affected by QE than those with shorter maturities. The fact that the 
announcement of the ABSPP and CBPP3 seems to affect short term maturities more is likely 
due to the fact that the ECB lowered their key interest rates (which are short term) by 10 basis 
points each on the same day, as mentioned before in chapter 2.3. 
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3.3.3. Results for selected non-euro area countries 
Regarding the non-euro area countries in Table 4, we have found less statistically significant 
results. This is what we expected, since those bonds are not eligible for the QE programme and 
thus will not be purchased by the ECB. However, we wanted to test if they are somewhat 
indirectly affected by potential spill over effects. 
Table 4: Event study results for selected non-euro area countries 
 
As one can see, there are only significant variations in yields for bonds with short maturities 
for Switzerland and Norway for the PSPP announcement. When it comes to Denmark, we found 
several significant changes in yields for the first announcement. However, we suspected this, 
since the Danish krone is pegged to the euro in the ERM II (Exchange Rate Mechanism). Since 
Denmark joined this mechanism in 1999, the Danish National Bank keeps the krone within a 
+/- 2.25% fluctuation margin of the exchange rate 7.46038 DKK = 1.00000 EUR (European 
Commission, 2013). 
Regarding Switzerland, we found significant negative variations in yields for the second 
announcement. However, we should take these with a grain of salt, since the Swiss National 
Bank had just announced the decoupling of the Swiss franc from the euro a week earlier, on 15 
January 2015. This resulted in the Swiss franc appreciating dramatically and the exchange rate 
dropping from 1.20 CHF = 1 EUR to 0.85 CHF = 1 EUR. During the financial crisis, the Swiss 
franc had become a ‘safe haven’ for investors which led to an enormous demand for this 
currency. To keep its exchange rate low, the Swiss national bank had created new francs that 
were being used to purchase euros. This increased the money supply and thus caused the franc 
Country Date 1m 3m 6m 1y 3y 5y 10y 20y 30y
Denmark 2014-09-04 1 day variation -0,0217 -0,0060 -0,0313 -0,0405 -0,0541 -0,0448 0,0159 0,0830 0,0879
ABSPP and CBPP3 announcement t-statistic -1,8327 -0,6697 -3,6591 -4,6529 -3,2823 -2,0437 0,5367 2,3726 1,6628
2015-01-22 1 day variation 0,0247 0,0130 -0,0020 -0,0246 -0,0431 -0,0383 -0,0625 -0,0677 -0,0455
PSPP announcement (QE) t-statistic 0,6567 0,3867 -0,0668 -0,9820 -1,9433 -1,6948 -2,0952 -1,6790 -0,8241
Norway 2014-09-04 1 day variation -0,0247 -0,0320 -0,0058 0,0004 0,0117 0,0134 0,0061 x x
ABSPP and CBPP3 announcement t-statistic -0,9068 -2,2696 -0,5355 0,0413 0,7728 0,6804 0,2198 x x
2015-01-22 1 day variation -0,0132 -0,0010 -0,0631 -0,0754 -0,0777 -0,0733 -0,0751 x x
PSPP announcement (QE) t-statistic -0,4314 -0,0388 -2,3925 -2,4733 -1,7310 -1,4218 -1,6503 x x
Sweden 2014-09-04 1 day variation -0,0379 -0,0247 -0,0128 -0,0093 -0,0331 -0,0294 0,0025 0,0021 0,0506
ABSPP and CBPP3 announcement t-statistic -1,9970 -2,5606 -1,5680 -1,1183 -1,8526 -1,2453 0,0804 0,0608 1,3902
2015-01-22 1 day variation -0,0168 -0,0159 -0,0138 -0,0068 0,0012 -0,0021 -0,0185 -0,0242 -0,0242
PSPP announcement (QE) t-statistic -0,5809 -0,8485 -1,1860 -0,7606 0,0875 -0,1102 -0,7037 -0,6923 -0,6923
Switzerland 2014-09-04 1 day variation 0,1768 0,1155 0,0468 -0,0245 -0,0122 -0,0054 0,0192 0,0439 -0,0036
ABSPP and CBPP3 announcement t-statistic 1,4188 1,2434 0,8269 -1,3211 -1,3645 -0,3737 0,8117 1,5488 -0,1336
2015-01-22 1 day variation -0,4653 -0,3736 -0,2616 -0,1211 -0,0593 -0,0583 -0,0009 -0,0894 0,0390
PSPP announcement (QE) t-statistic -3,0173 -2,9129 -2,6598 -1,7693 -1,1486 -1,3700 -0,0253 -1,8908 0,7640
UK 2014-09-04 1 day variation 0,0043 0,0083 0,0108 -0,0010 0,0070 0,0170 0,0230 0,0190 0,0210
ABSPP and CBPP3 announcement t-statistic 0,2253 0,6146 0,7184 -0,0452 0,1926 0,4329 0,5204 0,4497 0,5019
2015-01-22 1 day variation -0,0035 -0,0003 -0,0007 -0,0110 -0,0220 -0,0260 -0,0270 -0,0280 -0,0300
PSPP announcement (QE) t-statistic -0,1601 -0,0275 -0,0811 -0,6066 -0,0008 -0,5696 -0,5114 -0,4776 -0,5514
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to fall in value. Through this mechanism, the exchange rate had been pegged for several years 
(The Economist, 2015). 
According to this article from The Economist (2015) from 18 January 2015, “many expect[ed] 
the European Central Bank to introduce ‘quantitative easing’… something that is happening 
this Thursday [22 January 2015]”. This article proves that the QE announcement on that day 
had been widely expected by investors and that the unpegging of the Swiss franc a week earlier 
was most likely not an independent event. This means that an observed fall in the Swiss yields 
is likely due to the announcement of the Swiss National Bank from 15 January 2015 and thus 
not independent from the announcement of the ECB. It is possible that either central bank might 
have made their announcement as a reaction towards the other’s announcement. 
Having presented and discussed the results of our event study, we will now conduct a further 
empirical analysis of the PSPP announcement on 22 January 2015, which will involve time 
series forecasting. 
However, before continuing, we must highlight one particular weakness of our model in this 
chapter. We have been made aware of this by our examiner after our defence of this paper. The 
simple random walk model that we used fails to account for the negative drift of the random 
walk time series, which is clearly visible in figure 2. The bond yields have been drifting 
downwards for a long period of time prior to the announcements. The ARMA models that we 
are establishing in the next chapter capture these negative drift terms, as can be seen by the 
negative µ terms in the equations above the forecasted graphs shown in appendix A5. Had we 
used ARMA forecasting to model expected normal returns, by effectively combining both our 
models in chapters 3 and 4, we would have obtained better overall results. 
  
23 
4.  Forecasting bond yields with ARMA modelling 
The purpose of this section is to estimate how bond yields would have moved if our event of 
interest, the PSPP announcement on January 22, did not take place. We constructed an ARMA 
model for nine different bond yields and by using forecast tools on EViews, we retrieved a new 
time series (i.e. a dynamic forecast) for each yield of interest. Before starting, we were expecting 
the forecasts to be above the actual yields because through the QE programme, yields should 
become lower in the future, and markets should immediately react to this. In the following 
sections we will go through theory and methodology for our ARMA model. 
 
4.1. Theory on univariate time series modelling 
This theory part, including its formulas, is based on chapter 5 of Chris Brooks’s book 
“Introductory Econometrics for Finance” (2008, pp. 206-264) and on the lecture notes provided 
by Jens Forssbæck during the course “Financial Econometrics BUSN80” at Lund University 
School of Economics (Forssbæck, 2014).  
A univariate time-series model is represented by a single variable that follows a stochastic 
process that evolves over time. This process is determined only by past values of the variable 
itself. The purpose of this kind of technique is to build a conceivable model able to establish 
how this variable evolves over time. In the following we will discuss which time series 
processes exist and briefly outline the theory behind them. 
4.1.1. Moving average process (MA) 
A moving average (MA) process represents the first type of time series model we are describing. 
Let 𝑢𝑡  (𝑡 = 1, 2, 3, … ) be a white noise process
9, with mean 𝐸(𝑢𝑡) = 0 and 
variance 𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑢𝑡) =  𝜎
2. The qth order moving average process is then: 
𝑦𝑡 =  𝜇 + 𝑢𝑡 + 𝜃1𝑢𝑡−1 + 𝜃2𝑢𝑡−2 + ⋯ + 𝜃𝑞𝑢𝑡−𝑞 (6) 
This can also be written using sigma notation: 
 𝑦𝑡 = 𝜇 + ∑ 𝜃𝑖𝑢𝑡−𝑖
𝑞
𝑖=1 + 𝑢𝑡 (7) 
                                                 
9 A white noise process is one with no discernible structure. Its definition is: 
 𝐸(𝑦𝑡) =  𝜇 (constant mean) 
 𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑦𝑡) =  𝜎
2 (constant variance) 
 𝛾𝑠 =  {
𝜎2𝑖𝑓 𝑠 = 0
0 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
 (zero auto-covariance) 
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So, a moving average process is a linear regression of a white noise process where the dependent 
variable (𝑦𝑡) depends on current and past values of white noise disturbance.  
The properties implied by an MA (q) process are: 
𝐸(𝑦𝑡) = 𝜇 (8) 
𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑦𝑡) = 𝛾0 = (1 + 𝜃1
2 + 𝜃2
2 + ⋯ + 𝜃𝑞
2)𝜎2 (recall that 𝜎2 = 𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑢𝑡)) (9) 
𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑦𝑡, 𝑦𝑡−𝑠) = 𝛾𝑠 = {
(𝜃𝑠 + 𝜃𝑠+1𝜃1 + 𝜃𝑠+2𝜃2 + ⋯ + 𝜃𝑞𝜃1−𝑠)𝜎
2
0 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑠 > 𝑞
 for s = 1,2,…,q  (10) 
What is important to highlight for an MA (q) process, is that the autocorrelation function 
(ACF)10 will drop to zero after lag q. 
4.1.2. Autoregressive process (AR) 
In this process, the dependent variable (still represented by 𝑦𝑡) depends only on the value that 
it took during the previous period and an error term. An AR(p) process is then given by the 
following equation:  
𝑦𝑡 =  𝜇 +  𝜙1𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝜙2𝑦𝑡−2 + ⋯ +  𝜙𝑝𝑦𝑡−𝑝 + 𝑢𝑡 (11) 
Using sigma notation, it can be written as: 
𝑦𝑡 = 𝜇 + ∑ 𝜙𝑖𝑦𝑡−𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖
𝑝
𝑖=1  (12) 
The properties of an AR(p) model are:  
𝐸(𝑦𝑡) =  
𝜇
1−𝜙1−𝜙2−⋯−𝜙𝑝
    (13) 
𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑦𝑡) =  𝛾0 = 𝜙1𝛾1 + 𝜙2𝛾2 + ⋯ + 𝜙𝑝𝛾𝑝 + 𝜎
2 (14) 
𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑦𝑡, 𝑦𝑡−1) = 𝛾𝑠 = 𝜙1𝛾𝑠−1 + 𝜙2𝛾𝑠−2 + ⋯ + 𝜙𝑝𝛾𝑠−𝑝 (15) 
One of the most important properties of an AR(p) process is that the autocovariance implies 
that the ACF decays gradually as long as 𝜙𝑖 < 1 ∀ 𝑖 = 1,2, … , 𝑝. 
                                                 
10 The dependence of 𝑦𝑡on itself across time is measured by its autocorrelation. Therefore, the autocorrelation 
function (ACF) represents the autocorrelations of the number of lags  
 𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟(𝑦𝑡 , 𝑦𝑡) =
𝛾0
𝛾0
= 1 
 𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟(𝑦𝑡 , 𝑦𝑡−1) =
𝛾1
𝛾0
= 𝜏1 
 𝐸𝑡𝑐. 
The ACF is usually illustrated by a correlogram.  
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An AR(1) process can be either stationary or non-stationary. For the process to be stationary, 
we need 𝜙 < 1. This means that any shocks to the series will gradually die away and the series 
will tend towards its mean value. Thus a stationary process is also called a ‘mean-reverting 
process’. For the case where 𝜙 = 0, we have a so called ‘zero-mean white-noise process’. For 
non-stationarity, we need to have 𝜙 ≥ 1.  In the case where 𝜙 = 1, shocks will persist and never 
die away. This is called a ‘random walk’ (if 𝜇 = 0). If 𝜇 ≠ 0, we have a so-called ‘random walk 
with drift’. In the other case when 𝜙 > 1, we have a so-called ‘explosive process’. This means 
a shock will become more influential if time goes on, and the time series will drift away quickly 
from its mean value (Forssbæck, 2014). 
4.1.3. ARMA process 
If we combine together the AR(p) and the MA(q) models, we obtain an ARMA(p,q) model: 
𝑦𝑡 =  𝜇 +  𝜙1𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝜙2𝑦𝑡−2 + ⋯ +  𝜙𝑝𝑦𝑡−𝑝 + 𝜃1𝑢𝑡−1 + 𝜃2𝑢𝑡−2 + ⋯ + 𝜃𝑞𝑢𝑡−𝑞 + 𝑢𝑡 (16) 
The characteristics for the white noise process are: 
𝐸(𝑢𝑡) = 0; 𝐸(𝑢𝑡
2) = 𝜎2; 𝐸(𝑢𝑡 , 𝑢𝑠) = 0, 𝑡 ≠ 𝑠 (17) 
The mean of ARMA model series is given by:11 
𝐸(𝑦𝑡) =  
𝜇
1−𝜙1−𝜙2−⋯−𝜙𝑝
 (18) 
The stationary condition for an ARMA(p,q) model is: 
1 − ∑ 𝜙𝑖
𝑝
𝑖=1 > 0 (19) 
4.1.4. ARMA modelling 
Box and Jenkins (1976) were the first to estimate an ARMA model using a specific systematic 
method. This method is called the three-step approach: 
 Identification: determining the right order of the model. 
 Estimation: OLS or other methods. 
 Diagnostic checking: 
o Over fitting (meaning that all the unnecessary items will be insignificant) 
o Residual Diagnostics (checking for autocorrelation in residuals)  
                                                 
11 The mean of the ARMA model is identical to the AR(p) mean. This is because the ACF for an ARMA process 
exhibits combinations of attitude derived from AR and MA parts, but for all lags ahead q, the ACF will simply be 
likewise the individual AR(p) model. 
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The identification of the model’s p-q order can be done by graphical methods, meaning the 
plotting of ACF and PACF correlograms. However, a better and somewhat simpler approach is 
using the information criteria (IC). ICs are a method that accounts for two different factors: the 
first term represents the sum of squares (RSS), while the second term serves as some kind of 
penalty due to the loss of degrees of freedom from adding additional parameters. The three most 
commonly used information criteria12 are: 
 Akaike´s (AIC) = ln(?̂?2) + 2𝐾/𝑇  
 Schwarz´s Bayesian (SBIC) = ln(?̂?2) +
𝐾
𝑇
𝑙𝑛𝑇 
 Hannan-Quinn (HQIC) = ln(?̂?2) +
2𝐾
𝑇
ln (ln(𝑇)) 
Thus, the question arises as to which IC should be adopted. According to theory, SBIC is 
strongly consistent but inefficient, while AIC is the opposite. In other words, SBIC is able to 
deliver the right order for the model, although AIC will result, on average, in too large a model. 
Consequently, there is not a specific criterion or rule preferable or superior to another13. 
Having chosen the AIC, the easiest way to identify the appropriate model order is to take the 
one that minimizes the value of the IC. (Minimize IC s.t. 𝑝 ≤ 𝑝,̅  𝑞 ≤ ?̅?). In practice, we will 
choose the model with the lowest AIC value.  
4.1.5. Forecasting with ARMA 
Using the information criteria approach, we choose the model ARMA(p,q) model that best suits 
our variable. After estimating the model, our focus is now to use it to forecast future values of 
the dependent variable. The period we used to estimate the regression is called the ‘in-sample 
estimation period’ while the evaluation period is called the ‘out-of-sample forecast’. This gives 
us the following time line (adapted from Brooks (2008)): 
Figure 5: General example of a forecasting time line 
 
                                                 
12 ?̂?2 =
𝑅𝑆𝑆
𝑇−𝑘
, 𝑘 = 𝑝 + 𝑞 + 1, 𝑇 = 𝑠𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 
13 We decided to use the AIC to determine the best model fit, since it is the most widely used. 
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This is a generalised time-line for a k-days ‘in-sample estimation period’ starting at time t and 
ending at t + k. The n-days ‘out-of-sample forecast’ thus starts at time t + k + 1 and finishes at 
time t + k + n. 
It is important to highlight the following rules when forecasting with MA and AR: 
 MA(q) has a memory only for q periods. Therefore, 𝑓𝑡(𝑦𝑡+𝑠) = 𝜇 ∀ 𝑠 > 𝑞 
 AR(p) can make infinite-horizon forecasts. This is done by using past and present values 
and/or forecasted values of y 
For constructing the time series of the forecasts, there are two different approaches available in 
EViews; dynamic forecasts and static forecasts. According to the definition provided by Brooks 
(2008, p. 256), a dynamic forecast calculates “multistep-forecasts starting from the first period 
in the forecast sample”. A static forecast calculates “a sequence of one-step-ahead forecasts, 
rolling the sample forwards one observation after each forecast to use actual rather than 
forecasted values for lagged dependent variables” (Brooks, 2008, p. 256). In other words, only 
the actual data until the end of the “in-sample estimation period” are being used for both 
forecasts. For the dynamic forecast, only this data is being used exclusively. However, the static 
forecast will incorporate the forecasted values into the ‘in-sample estimation period’ for the 
next value being forecasted. Thus the ‘in-sample estimation period’ always grows by one lag 
for every additional value being forecasted in the ‘out-of sample forecast’. For our analysis we 
decided to use only the dynamic forecast since, by using this technique, the ‘in-sample 
estimation period’ will not change and thus, we can be certain not to take into account any 
values after 21 January 2015. 
Our purpose for conducting the forecast is not to predict how the government bond yields will 
move in the future, but to see, by comparing the forecasted yields with the actual yield values, 
how the bond yields were expected to have moved given that the PSPP announcement had not 
taken place. 
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4.2. Estimating our model 
4.2.1. Data and announcement specifications 
The objective of this analysis is to confirm our hypothesis of the forecasted yields calculated 
after the announcement being above the actual yields. We are expecting this, since through 
unconventional monetary policy measures, yields should become lower in the future, as 
discussed in the section about QE theory. Consequently, markets should reflect this information 
immediately after the announcement by adjusting bond prices and thus yields. 
We selected three maturities (3Y, 5Y and 10Y), three countries (Germany, Italy and Spain) and 
the PSPP announcement. The reasons for these choices are various:  
 3Y, 5Y and 10Y are very commonly used maturities and the ones that offered the most 
significant results (see event study Table 3).  
 Germany, Italy and Spain offered significant results for all of these maturities.14 
 The purpose of this analysis is to confirm theory and our hypothesis, not to do it for all 
the countries and maturities. 
 The PSPP represents the official QE program. 
As we explained in the previous chapter, we started by estimating 16 models for each country 
and maturity (ARMA (p,q) with 0 ≤ 𝑝 ≤ 3 and 0 ≤ 𝑞 ≤ 3) in order to find the best model fit 
for each of them. These regressions represent the ‘in-sample estimation period’, i.e. 146 
observations, from 2014-07-01 to 2015-01-21 (the day before the PSPP announcement). 
To do that, we transformed the yields into single-period net returns using the formula below to 
induce stationarity: 
𝑅𝑡 =
𝑦𝑡−𝑦𝑡−1
𝑦𝑡−1
 (20) 
After that, we created a table (see appendix A4) with all the Akaike’s information criteria, where 
we highlighted in bold (and choose) the values that minimize the AIC. This resulted in the 
following models:15 
                                                 
14 With exception for Spain 5Y (t-test statistic of -1,9931 > -2.0452).  
15 For Italy 10Y, Germany 5Y and Germany 3Y we have had problems related to over fitting for MA terms. This 
means that all the unnecessary items will be insignificant. Due to this problem we selected, respectively, ARMA 
(2, 2), ARMA (1, 1) and ARMA (1, 1). 
29 
Table 5: Best model fit according to AIC 
 
Given these nine models above expressed in Table 5, we were ready to estimate the nine 
regressions. For each estimated regression, we have checked if they were stationary. Through 
the regression output in EViews, it is possible to go directly to the forecast tool. The “out-of-
sample forecast” is expressed by 42 observations, from 2015-01-22 to 2015-03-2216. Using this 
tool, we retrieved the new forecasted time-series for each regression. For example, for the 
German 10Y yield, we have two time series now: 
 10Y_yield (actual observations) 
 10Y_yield_dynamic_forecast 
Inputting our selected dates into the general forecasting time line gives us the following time 
line: 
Figure 6: Forecasting time line for our model 
 
After obtaining these results, we exported the time series into Excel. Obviously, since the 
forecasts are also expressed in return terms, we had to convert the results into yields by using 
the inverse formula for calculating returns, i.e. to obtain the yield calculated by using the 
dynamic forecast:  
𝑦𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡 (𝑡) =  𝑅𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡 (𝑡) ∗ 𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝑦𝑡−1 (21) 
                                                 
16 Even though we have 42 observations for the forecast, we will show only the first 8 of them. Our purpose is to 
illustrate the short term effect.  
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The graphs shown in appendix A5 are our results17.  
4.2.2. Results and interpretation 
Before conducting this ARMA model we were expecting the forecasts calculated after the 
announcement to be above the actual yields. Looking at all of the nine graphs, we can confirm 
that they support our initial hypothesis. The forecasted yields during the announcement day, 22 
January 2015, are always above the actual yields.  
Figure 7: Example of a graph forecasted with ARMA (Italy 10Y)18 
 
As one can see in Figure 7 above, the forecasted yield for the 10Y Italian bond on 22 January 
2015 was 1.8331%, whereas the actual yield had dropped to 1.7062%. A few days later, the 
forecasted line and the actual line crossed, before converging finally. Here, the abnormal 
variation can be interpreted as the difference between the black line and the dotted grey line. 
The other graphs of our forecasts are included in the appendix (see A5) and all give a similar 
picture. 
After performing this analysis, we were surprised about how precise the forecasts were. We 
agreed that this is due to the lower volatility of bond prices as Reilly, et al. (2000) had stated as 
                                                 
17 The time expressed in the graph is from 1/16/2015 to 2/02/2015. (t= 12 days) (We used the American date format 
due to EViews). 
18 We used the vertical red line to highlight the event day (1/22/2015). 
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a finding of their empirical research. They found that the annual bond volatility is dependent 
on the prior year’s bond return volatility and this means bond volatility is relatively persistent. 
Given this behaviour of bond yields, with our ARMA model, we are now able to confirm the 
results of our previously conducted event study. Recalling that the maturities and countries we 
have used gave significant results in the event study analysis, we can confirm our findings also 
with the ARMA forecasts that showed actual observed yields being lower than expected yields. 
If the PSPP announcement did not take place, the yields would not have decreased by that much, 
meaning that the markets reacted immediately to the announcement. This is because investors 
are expecting the yields of euro area sovereign bonds to decrease in the future, when the ECB 
will start the purchase programme on 9 March 2015. These expectations are immediately 
reflected in the lower yields following the announcement on 22 January 2015. 
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5. Conclusion 
We have examined the effect of the ABSPP/CBPP3 and the PSPP announcements on bond 
yields in the Eurozone using the event study methodology and found significant abnormal 
variations in yields around these two announcements. These changes were mostly negative 
(with very few exceptions, such as the Austrian 20Y and 30Y bonds, as well as Dutch 30Y 
bonds) suggesting that the yields dropped as an immediate effect of the announcement. This is 
due to investors expecting lower future yields for sovereign euro area bonds as a consequence 
of the ECB QE programme. The monthly asset purchases of up to €60 billion will result in a 
higher demand for sovereign debt securities and thus increase their prices and thus in return 
will lower their yields (see bond pricing formulas in appendix A3). 
We then used ARMA models in order to forecast how bond yields were expected to move if 
the PSPP announcement, on January 22, had not taken place. The results confirmed our initial 
hypothesis, and we have found that forecasted yields, calculated after the announcement, were 
above the actual yields. Thanks to these two analyses, we clearly state that the market reacted 
to the ECB announcements of unconventional monetary policy. By doing so, the market is 
expecting yields in the euro area to decrease in the near future.  
The program officially started on 9 March 2015, so it is still too early for us to discuss about 
the long term effects of the program. Our aim was to identify, quantify and analyse the 
immediate market reaction right after the announcements. We could confirm that a significant 
market reaction happened. This may somewhat be surprising, since many had expected the ECB 
to announce QE on that day. But according to Flanders (2015) this reaction can reflect what 
investors needed to hear: that the ECB is willing to achieve its inflation target by adopting 
unconventional monetary policy measures. Flanders (2015) also states that such a program was 
also needed to give a proper response to the deflation that is currently threatening the Eurozone. 
If this response of the ECB was an effective one, we cannot and dare not say with our research. 
We are expecting to see more research being published soon about the ECB quantitative easing 
policy. For long term effects however, this might still take several years. 
Finally, we would like to highlight again the weakness of our model used in chapter 3, which 
fails to account for the negative drift terms in the yield time series. A possible remedy for this 
would be to merge our models and thus using ARMA forecasting to model expected normal 
returns. This would have improved our results and thus should be recommended for any future 
event studies on this topic. 
  
33 
Bibliography 
 
Asgharian, H., 2014. Empirical Finance, lecture notes distributed in Empirical Finance 
NEKN82 at Lund University. Lund: Lund University School of Economics and Management. 
Berk, J. & DeMarzo, P., 2014. Corporate Finance. 3 ed. Essex: Pearson. 
Brooks, C., 2008. Introductory Econometrics for Finance. 2 ed. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Claeys, G., Leandro, A. & Mandra, A., 2015. European Central Bank Quantitative Easing, 
Brussels: Brugel Policy Contribution. 
ECB, 2011. Guideline of the ECB of 20 September 2011 on monetary policy instruments and 
procedures of the Eurosystem. [Online]  
Available at: https://www.ecb.europa.eu/ecb/legal/pdf/l_33120111214en000100951.pdf 
[Accessed 20 May 2015]. 
ECB, 2014. Introductory statement to the press conference on 4 September 2014. [Online]  
Available at: https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pressconf/2014/html/is140904.en.html 
[Accessed 20 May 2015]. 
ECB, 2015a. Euro area yield curve. [Online]  
Available at: https://www.ecb.europa.eu/stats/money/yc/html/index.en.html 
[Accessed 5 April 2015]. 
ECB, 2015b. Monetary Policy. [Online]  
Available at: http://www.ecb.europa.eu/mopo/html/index.en.html 
[Accessed 14 April 2015]. 
ECB, 2015c. Press Release: ECB announces expanded asset purchase programme. [Online]  
Available at: http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2015/html/pr150122_1.en.html 
[Accessed 06 April 2015]. 
ECB, 2015d. ECB Key interest rates. [Online]  
Available at: https://www.ecb.europa.eu/stats/monetary/rates/html/index.en.html 
[Accessed 18 May 2015]. 
European Commission, 2013. Economic and Financial Affairs - Denmark and the euro. 
[Online]  
Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/euro/countries/denmark_en.htm 
[Accessed 17 May 2015]. 
Eurostat, 2015. Gross domestic product at market prices. [Online]  
Available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/tgm/refreshTableAction.do?tab=table&plugin=1&pcode=tec0000
1&language=en 
[Accessed 18 May 2015]. 
Flanders, S., 2015. Draghi has only done enough for now. [Online]  
Available at: http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/f9557d18-a247-11e4-aba2-
00144feab7de.html#axzz3aVAa3LIx 
[Accessed 18 May 2015]. 
Forssbæck, J., 2014. Financial Econometrics BUSN80 (lecture notes). Lund: Lund University 
School of Economics and Management. 
34 
Fratzscher, M., Lo Duca, M. & Straub, R., 2014. ECB Unconventional Monetary Policy 
Actions: Market Impact, international Spillovers and Transmission Channels. Washington 
DC, Jacques Polak Annual Research Conference. 
Goldman Sachs, 2015. European Central Bank Unveils Quantitative Easing, s.l.: Goldman 
Sachs. 
Hausken, K. & Ncube, M., 2013. Quantitative Easing and Its Impact in the US, Japan, the 
UK and Europe. Heidelberg: Springer. 
Joyce, M. A. S., Lasaosa, A., Stevens, I. & Tong, M., 2011. The Financial Market Impact of 
Quantitative Easing in the United Kingdom. International Journal of Central Banking, 7(3), 
pp. 113-161. 
Krugman, P., Obstfeld, M. & Melitz, M., 2015. International Economics - Theory and Policy. 
10 ed. Essex: Pearson Education. 
Lu, Y., 2013. Quantitative Easing: Reflections on Practice and Theory. World Review of 
Political Economy, 4(3), pp. 341-356. 
Modigliani, F. & Sutch, R., 1966. Innovations in Interest Rate Policy. The American 
Economic Review, Volume 56, No. 1/2, pp. 178-197. 
Reilly, R. K., Wright, D. J. & Chan, K. C., 2000. Bond Market Volatility Compared to Stock 
Market Volatility. CFA Journal of Portfolio Management, No. 1, 27(Fall 2000), pp. 89-92. 
Rivolta, G., 2014. An event study analysis of ECB unconventional monetary policy. Milan: 
University of Milan - Department of Economics. 
Standard and Poors, 2015. Sovereigns Rating List. [Online]  
Available at: http://www.standardandpoors.com/ratings/sovereigns/ratings-
list/en/eu/?subSectorCode=39&sectorId=1221186707758&subSectorId=1221187348494 
[Accessed 13 May 2015]. 
Swanson, E. T., Reichlin, L. & Wright, J. H., 2011. A High-Frequency Event-Study Analysis 
of Operation Twist and Its Implication for QE2 (with Comments and Discussion). Brookings 
Papers on Economic Activity, pp. 151-207. 
The Economist, 2015. The Economist explains: Why the Swiss unpegged the franc. [Online]  
Available at: http://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2015/01/economist-
explains-13 
[Accessed 17 May 2015]. 
 
  
35 
Appendix 
A1. Acronyms and definitions 
 
ABSPP: Asset Backed Securities Purchase Programme 
CBPP3: 3rd Covered Bond Purchase Programme 
EAPP:  Extended Asset Purchase Programme (= ABSPP + CBPP3 + PSPP) 
ESM:  European Stability Mechanism 
LTRO(s): Long Term Refinancing Operations 
OMT(s): Outright Monetary Transactions 
PSPP:  Public Sector Purchase Programme 
QE:  Quantitative Easing 
SMP:  Securities Markets Programme 
 
A2. Event timeline 
 
4 September 2014: ABSPP and CBPP3 announcement 
20 October 2014: CBPP3 start 
21 November 2014: ABSPP start 
22 January 2015: PSPP announcement 
9 March 2015: PSPP starts 
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A3. A quick review of bond valuation 
In the following, we will quickly review how bonds are valued in order to help our evaluation 
of our results. This review, including all the formulas, is based on chapter 6 of Berk & 
DeMarzo’s book “Corporate Finance” (2014, pp. 169-204). 
Bonds are debt securities that are sold either by corporations or governments. This allows them 
to raise big amounts of debt financing in the capital markets. A bond usually has two types of 
payments to the investors: the interest payment, called the coupon and the principal, called the 
face value. Coupons are paid periodically, often semi-annually, and the face value is paid back 
upon the bond’s maturity, at which it expires. The maturity can be regarded as the time horizon 
of a loan, which can range from one month (short term) to 30 years (very long term). Typically, 
a bond’s face value are standard increments, e.g. 100€ or 1000€. 
Conventionally, the coupon rate is expressed as an APR (Annual Percentage Rate) and 
determines the amount of each coupon that is being paid. Let C denote a coupon payment 
expressed as a function of the coupon rate, the face value and the frequency of coupon 
payments: 
𝐶 =
𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑜𝑛 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒×𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑒 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒
𝑛𝑜.𝑜𝑓 𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑜𝑛 𝑝𝑎𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠
 (22) 
Thus, a bond with face value 1000€, a 10% coupon (APR) and a semi-annual coupon payment, 
has payments of 1000€ × 10%/2 = 50€ twice a year. 
A3.1. Zero-coupon bonds 
There is also another common type of bonds that actually do not pay any coupons. These are 
called zero coupon bonds, or pure discount bonds, which are the simplest type of bond. Thus, 
the only cash flow towards investors is the face value upon maturity. This means that those 
bonds must be issued at a discount (hence the name), and the difference between this discounted 
issue price and the face value presents the interest paid to investors. 
Another important concept for bond valuation is the yield to maturity (YTM)19. It is the discount 
rate that sets the present value of the bond payments equal to its current market price. For an n-
year zero coupon bond, YTM is given by the following formula: 
𝑌𝑇𝑀𝑛 = (
𝐹𝑉
𝑃
)
1/𝑛
− 1 (23) 
                                                 
19 N.B.: It is more common to just talk about the “yield” of a bond, although the term YTM would be more correct. 
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Where: 
 P: Current market price of bond 
 FV: Face value 
 n: no. of periods to maturity 
 YTM: Yield to maturity 
The YTM in the equation above is the rate of return per period for holding the bond from today 
until maturity at date n. (Berk & DeMarzo, 2014) For a default-free zero-coupon bond maturing 
at date n, the YTM equals the risk-free (interest) rate. Thus, the risk-free rate with maturity n is 
given by: 
𝑟𝑛 = 𝑌𝑇𝑀𝑛 (24) 
A3.2. Coupon bonds 
Coupon bonds pay back the face value at maturity, like zero-coupon bonds, but in addition also 
pay regular coupon interest payments. For a coupon bond, YTM is the interest rate y that solves 
the following equation for the current coupon bond market price: 
𝑃 = 𝐶 ×
1
𝑦
(1 −
1
(1+𝑦)𝑛
) +
𝐹𝑉
(1+𝑦)𝑛
 (25) 
Where: 
 y:  interest rate or YTM 
 C:  coupon payment 
 FV: face value 
 n:  no. of periods to maturity 
With this equation, if we know three of the four variables, we can easily calculate the missing 
one. For example, if we know the yield, the coupon payment, the face value and the number of 
periods to maturity, we can calculate the current market price of the bond. This formula also 
shows us that if the price of bond increases, its yield decreases, and vice-versa. Thus, yields and 
prices are often used interchangeably. In fact, usually yields are quoted by traders instead of 
prices. If prices are quoted, than it is usually as a percentage of its face value, e.g. a price of 
95,432 implies an actual price of 954,32€ if the face value is 1000€. 
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A3.3. The behaviour of bond prices 
Coupon bonds can trade at a discount (price < face value), at par (price = face value), or at a 
premium (price > face value). In the following, we shall discuss what this means and how bond 
prices change due to the passage of time and through fluctuations in interest rates. 
When a bond trades at a discount, investors will earn a return on both the face value and the 
coupons. Hence, the bond’s YTM exceeds the coupon rate. 
For bond that trades at a premium, investors’ return is diminished by a price that is higher than 
the face value. Thus, the YTM is lower than the coupon rate. An alternative explanation would 
be that a bond becomes more valuable, reflected in a higher price, the higher its coupon rate is 
relative to the interest rate required by investors for its level of risk. 
When a bond trades at a price equal to its face value, then it is said to trade at par. This means 
that its coupon rate is equal to the YTM. 
Table 6 below summarizes the above mentioned properties, assuming 𝑅𝑓 > 0 
Table 6: Bond properties 
 
Usually, when a coupon bond is issued, the coupon rate is chosen so that a bond trades at or 
close to par, i.e. at face value. The passage of time affects bond prices in the following way: 
For a zero-coupon bond, when the YTM stays constant, the bond price increases with the 
passage of time (that reduces the time to maturity), since the discount gets smaller. Ultimately, 
the bond price will approach face value. 
For a coupon bond, the situation is a bit more complicated. Whenever a coupon is paid, the 
bond price drops by the amount of that coupon. The value of a coupon bond increases until the 
coupon is paid and then drops after it has been paid. This results in a kind of saw tooth pattern. 
Since this pattern is quite predictable, investors are more interested in price changes due to 
changes in the yield. Thus, the clean price is often quoted instead of the dirty price: 
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𝐶𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑛 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 = 𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ(𝑑𝑖𝑟𝑡𝑦)𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 − 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑒𝑑 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 (26) 
Where: 
𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑒𝑑 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 = 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑜𝑛 × (
𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠 𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑜𝑛
𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑜𝑛 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑
) (27) 
By deducting accrued interest, which also follows a saw tooth pattern, the initial saw tooth 
pattern is eliminated. 
When it comes to interest rate changes and bond prices, we note the following: as interest rates 
in the economy fluctuate, the yields demanded by investors change accordingly. Assuming 
interest rates increase, the investors’ required yields will also increase, resulting in bond prices 
to fall. For a decrease in yields on the other hand, bond prices will increase. The bond’s duration 
is a formal measure of its sensitivity towards interest rate changes. 
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A4.  Akaike´s information criteria 
A4.1. Germany 
 
 
 
A4.2. Italy 
 
 
Germany_3Y ARMA(1,1)
AIC
AR/MA 0  MA(1) MA(2) MA(3)
0 3,687431 3,700871 3,714464
AR(1) 3,694405 3,708060 3,721669 3,734762
AR(2) 3,715038 3,728826 3,438433 3,451074
AR(3) 3,736022 3,749225 3,707019 3,718494
Germany_5Y ARMA(1,1)
AIC
AR/MA 0  MA(1) MA(2) MA(3)
0 2,29417 2,307759 2,319410
AR(1) 2,302706 2,314541 2,317101 2,326104
AR(2) 2,321873 2,323407 2,336871 2,339718
AR(3) 2,342997 2,186841 2,346379 2,360350
Germany_10Y ARMA(3,3)
AIC
AR/MA 0  MA(1) MA(2) MA(3)
0 -3,717207 -3,720311 -3,706966
AR(1) -3,707472 -3,717719 -3,704369 -3,693825
AR(2) -3,711268 -3,699426 -3,688553 -3,709467
AR(3) -3,695992 -3,683018 -3,800606 -3,808271
Italy_3Y ARMA(2,2)
AIC
AR/MA 0  MA(1) MA(2) MA(3)
0 -2,865208 -2,851527 -2,844597
AR(1) -2,861428 -2,849714 -2,858358 -2,853562
AR(2) -2,848698 -2,871032 -2,891647 -2,877766
AR(3) -2,837759 -2,836637 -2,865133 -2,881146
Italy_5Y ARMA(3,3)
AIC
AR/MA 0  MA(1) MA(2) MA(3)
0 -3,668688 -3,657493 -3,652787
AR(1) -3,672046 -3,684857 -3,675831 -3,663896
AR(2) -3,671830 -3,671830 -3,702397 -3,669595
AR(3) -3,652508 -3,676082 -3,690911 -3,706188
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A4.3. Spain 
 
 
 
 
  
Italy_10Y ARMA(2,2)
AIC
AR/MA 0  MA(1) MA(2) MA(3)
0 -4,941091 -4,933930 -4,930218
AR(1) -4,951790 -4,963238 -4,949445 -4,935699
AR(2) -4,940555 -4,945807 -4,932066 -5,082469
AR(3) -4,932550 -4,927249 -4,938922 -4,950421
Spain_3Y ARMA(2,2)
AIC
AR/MA 0  MA(1) MA(2) MA(3)
0 -2,80394 -2,791018 -2,836435
AR(1) -2,803820 -2,792308 -2,822614 -2,825151
AR(2) -2,791970 -2,810213 -2,847570 -2,846360
AR(3) -2,811826 -2,814396 -2,824871 -2,811513
Spain_5Y ARMA(2,3)
AIC
AR/MA 0  MA(1) MA(2) MA(3)
0 -3,369047 -3,364827 -3,388908
AR(1) -3,376468 -3,392837 -3,400742 -3,384499
AR(2) -3,367710 -3,393743 -3,383632 -3,427304
AR(3) -3,386914 -3,401606 -3,422512 -3,409494
Spain_10Y ARMA(2,3)
AIC
AR/MA 0  MA(1) MA(2) MA(3)
0 -4,816331 -4,822573 -4,850397
AR(1) -4,832150 -4,873593 -4,887833 -4,876270
AR(2) -4,835895 -4,880792 -4,874010 -4,899046
AR(3) -4,869008 -4,870316 -4,884737 -4,884323
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A5. Forecast of yields using an ARMA model 
A5.1.  Germany  
Figure 8: Forecast Germany 3Y Yield 
ARMA (1,1)  𝑦𝑡 =  −0,0270 − 0,1392𝑦𝑡−1 + 0,0965𝑢𝑡−1 
 
Figure 9: Forecast Germany 5Y Yield 
ARMA (1,1)  𝑦𝑡 =  −0,1053 + 0,0744 𝑦𝑡−1 + 0,1930𝑢𝑡−1 
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Figure 10: Forecast Germany 10Y Yield 
ARMA (3,3)  𝑦𝑡 =  −0,0063 − 0,0883𝑦𝑡−1 + 0,0964𝑦𝑡−2 +  0,9628𝑦𝑡−3 + 0,0227𝑢𝑡−1 − 0,0130𝑢𝑡−2 −
0,9514𝑢𝑡−3 
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A5.2. Italy 
Figure 11: Forecast Italy 3Y Yield 
ARMA (2,2)  𝑦𝑡 =  −0,0018 +  1,5403𝑦𝑡−1 − 0,9832𝑦𝑡−2 − 1,5437𝑢𝑡−1 + 0,9669𝑢𝑡−2 
 
Figure 12: Forecast Italy 5Y Yield 
ARMA (3,3)  𝑦𝑡 =  −0,0027 + 0,5963𝑦𝑡−1 + 0,4882𝑦𝑡−2  − 0,9466𝑦𝑡−3 − 0,6530𝑢𝑡−1 − 0,4236𝑢𝑡−2 +
0,8760𝑢𝑡−3 
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Figure 13: Forecast Italy 10Y Yield 
ARMA (2,2)  𝑦𝑡 =  −0,0030 −  0,9967𝑦𝑡−1 − 0,0710𝑦𝑡−2 + 0,9250𝑢𝑡−1 − 0,0755𝑢𝑡−2 
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A5.3. Spain 
Figure 14: Forecast Spain 3Y Yield 
ARMA (2,2)  𝑦𝑡 =  −0,0005 − 0,8474 𝑦𝑡−1 − 0,8129𝑦𝑡−2 + 0,9803𝑢𝑡−1 + 0,9849𝑢𝑡−2 
 
Figure 15: Forecast Spain 5Y Yield 
ARMA (2,3)  𝑦𝑡 =  −0,0010 − 0,0266𝑦𝑡−1 + 0,7417𝑦𝑡−2 + 0,0278𝑢𝑡−1 − 0,7879𝑢𝑡−2 − 0,2398𝑢𝑡−3 
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Figure 16: Forecast Spain 10Y Yield 
ARMA (2,3)  𝑦𝑡 =  −0,0033 +  0,0141𝑦𝑡−1 + 0,7550𝑦𝑡−2 − 0,0078𝑢𝑡−1 − 0,72282𝑢𝑡−2 − 0,2468𝑢𝑡−3 
 
A6.  Miscellaneous graphs 
 
Figure 17: Euro area countries by GDP size (market prices) 
 
Source: (Eurostat, 2015) 
